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IS THE MARYLAND DIRECTOR AND OFFICER 





The Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988 permits 
corporate directors, officers, and stockholders to bargain among the·m-
selves to determine the extent of the limitation on the liability of officers 
and directors for their actions or inactions in the conduct of corporate 
business. 1 Management determines its obligations by contracting with 
shareholders in regard to the risks each party agrees to assume in the 
management of the corporation. Their responsibilities to each other are 
based primarily on the freedom each side has to contract or not to 
contract. 
This statement of the purpose and structure of the Maryland statute 
is overly simplistic because the statute does prohibit the parties from lim-
iting liability for a manager's receipt of "an improper benefit or profit in 
money, property, or services,"2 or where "the person's action, or failure 
to act, was the result of active and deliberate dishonesty .... " 3 Absent in 
the new statute, however, is language which requires loyalty of the man-
ager in the conduct of corporate affairs.4 
Legal scholars have traditionally described the obligation between 
corporate managers and the entity they serve as a fiduciary duty. The 
legal model of the statute prior to the 1988 amendment was based pri-
t Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law; B.S., 1976, Calvin Col-
lege; J.D., 1978, Pepperdine University; LL.M, 1981, Temple University. 
1. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2(a) (Supp. 1988). Section 2-405.2 
provides: 
(a) Effect of corporate charter. - The charter of the corporation may in-
clude any provision expanding or limiting the liability of its directors and 
officers to the corporation or its stockholder for money damages but may 
not include any provision which restricts or limits the liability of its direc-
tors or officers to the corporation or its stockholders: 
(1) To the extent that it is proved that the person actually received an 
improper benefit or profit in money, property, or services ... actually 
received; 
(2) To the extent that a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to 
the person is entered in a proceeding based on a finding in the proceed-
ing that the person's action or failure to act, was the result of active 
and deliberate dishonesty and was material to the cause of action adju-
dicated in the proceeding. 
2. /d. § 405.2(a)(l). 
3. /d. § 405.2(a)(2). 
4. Hanks, Maryland Adopts Director and Officer Liability Statute, 2 INSIGHTS, No. 3, 
Mar. 1988; see also Sargent, Two Cheers For the Maryland Director and Officer Lia-
bility Statute, 18 U. BALT. L. REv. 278, 295-302 (1989). 
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marily on trust law:5 the manager, as a fiduciary or trustee, had the trust 
of the shareholders in exchange for his obligation ofloyalty.6 This model 
assumes an inherent obligation on behalf of the manager to act for the 
benefit of shareholders and to be primarily loyal to them. 7 The new stat-
ute, on the other hand, adopts a contractarian model, 8 leaving the obliga-
tions between managers and shareholders subject to allocation by 
contract. Yet, who can possibly accuse the drafters of the new statute 
with any wrongful intent, or indeed, as the title of this Article suggests, 
of sexism, when the drafters' intent seems only to maximize individual 
choice? 
The short answer is that the drafters have essentially eliminated the 
common law duty of loyalty from the new statute by elevating the place 
of bargaining to determine the obligation of management to sharehold-
ers. This shift in models will have a negative impact on the relationship 
between managers and investors in Maryland corporations. Both the 
drafters' preference for a contract model, 9 and their lack of concern for 
the affect of the contract model on the relationship between management 
and shareholders, are the bases for the argument that the Maryland Di-
rector and Officer Statute of 1988 is male-oriented. 10 
5. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.l(a) (1985); see also Maryland Metals v. 
Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978); Chesapeake Contr. Corp. v. Rodman, 
256 Md. 531, 261 A.2d 156 (1970); Indurated Concrete Corp. v. Abbott, 195 Md. 
496, 74 A.2d 17 (1950). 
6. Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 800 (1983). The connection be-
tween the duty of loyalty and the trust theory arises because the trustee is held to a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty. Corporate law adopted the trust analogy early on and 
courts announced that directors in corporations also would owe a duty of loyalty to 
the corporation. 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPO-
RATIONS § 1 (rev. perm. ed. 1983). 
7. Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 
COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1407 n.l5 (1985). Brudney notes: 
[H]e expects [under the fiduciary model] and is entitled to have the trustee 
exercise its best efforts solely to serve the (settlor's) beneficiary's welfare 
and to refrain from using trust property for any purpose other than one in 
the (settlor's) beneficiary's exclusive interest. 
/d. Brudney argues further: 
Neither the more "paternalistic" vision nor the "relational contract" con-
cept of contract law embraces the protective stance of the fiduciary stric-
tures which inform agency law. 
!d. at 1407. 
8. See generally Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcoN. 
288, 290-93, 295 (1980); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FtN. EcoN. 305, 308-11 (1976); cf. 
D. BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF FIDUCIARY DuTY (1986) (Bayne assumes that the fiduciary model is the 
starting point of corporate governance). 
9. See Butler & Ribstein, Free at Last? The Contractual Theory of the Corporation and 
the New Maryland Officer-Director Liability Provisions, 18 U. BALT. L. REv. 352, 
353-60 (1989). 
10. This article will not fully develop a philosophical analysis of the differences between 
the male and female-oriented ethical models. Ethicist Annette Baier has done that 
elsewhere. See Baier, What Women Want in a Moral Theory?, 19 Nous 53-64 
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II. THE CONTRACT MODEL IN ETHICS 
To understand the significance of this shift in models of decision 
making and its negative impact on the relationship between managers 
and shareholders, an examination of the debate concerning the most ap-
propriate ethical model for obligations between parties is instructive. 11 
The ethicist Annette Baier argues that there are competing models 
in ethics which she labels "contractarian" and "trust" models. To 
understand Baier's use of these labels, it is necessary to examine her 
assumptions in defining a "trust" model as distinguished from a "con-
tractarian" model. 
The trust model is based on the proposition that human relation-
ships thrive only in an atmosphere of trust-a relationship best exempli-
fied by that of parent and child-where the parent is trusted by the child 
to care for it. 12 The focus in the trust model is on the potential growth of 
the relationship and the distribution of risks as they arise. Entrustors13 
assume certain risks in the hope that a greater benefit will result from the 
relationship. 14 
(1985). Instead, the author assumes that differences in these ethical models do in 
fact exist. 
11. See Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231 (1986). Whenever there are shifts in 
the underlying models of legal obligations, the legal profession needs to be aware 
that ethicists (those philosophers who pay particular attention to the bases or mod-
els of "oughts" between individuals in society) have special insights into the conse-
quences of such shifts in models of obligations. The ethicist's study of the cohesion, 
pattern, or model for making decisions that concern others is similar if not founda-
tional to the lawyer's study of the cohesion, patterns, and models that guide judicial 
decisions. Ethical models are instructive in understanding the consequences of the 
decision making models statutes adopt to guide behavior. At least one legal scholar 
has seen the import of analyzing the ethical models of obligations as they relate to 
tax law. See Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Move-
ment: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987). 
12. To Baier, there is no sense in which the child contracts with its parent to distribute 
risks between them. The parents are simply trusted to care for the child, and with-
out trust the relationship will not thrive. Baier, supra note 11, at 241. 
13. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 6, at 800 (1983). The author uses the en-
trustor as Professor Frankel does. Frankel writes: 
'En trustor' appears to be most descriptive because it connotes both aspects 
of what this Article defines as the unifying features of fiduciary relations. 
The first feature, the 'substitution function,' in which the fiduciary per-
forms services as a 'stand in' for the entrustor, is suggested by the root 
"trust" . . . . The second feature, the 'delegation of power,' in which the 
fiduciary granted the power to perform these functions, is suggested by the 
word 'entrust,' which means '[t]o confide ... the execution of (a task) to 
... a person.' 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (pt. 2) 225 (J. Murray ed. 
1897). 
/d. n.18. 
14. Baier, supra note 11, at 251. Baier states: 
Contracts distribute and redistribute risk so as to minimize it for both 
parties, but trusting those more powerful persons who purport to love one 
increases one's risks while increasing the good one can hope to secure. 
Trust in fellow contractors is a limit [sic] case of trust, in which fewer risks 
are taken, for the sake of lesser goods. 
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The contractarian model, however, depends upon the existence of 
explicit promises as the basis for the relationship and attempts to pro-
spectively distribute all risks among the parties. The contractarian 
model rejects the principle that trust is essential to a thriving relationship 
and instead promotes self-interested, adversarial bargaining to establish 
the obligations of the parties. 15 The contracting parties consider their 
own security and have no general obligation to take care of the other. 16 
To bargain successfully, the parties must anticipate all risks that may 
arise from the relationship. In most long-term relationships, however, 
anticipation of all risks is very difficult if not impossible. 17 
Baier's argument that the contractarian model is male-oriented is 
based on the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan, who maintains that 
males and females have different preferences for ways of making deci-
sions.18 Baier argues that womens' heightened concerns for relationships 
affect their ethical models for decision making: 
Women cannot now, any more than they could when op-
pressed, ignore that part of morality and those forms of trust 
which cannot easily be forced into the liberal and particularly 
the contractarian mold. Men may but women cannot see mo-
rality as essentially a matter of keeping to the minimal traffic 
rules, designed to restrict close encounters between autono-
mous persons to self-chosen ones. Such a conception presup-
poses both an equality of power and a natural separateness 
from others, which is alien to women's experience of life and 
morality. For those most of whose daily dealings are with the 
less powerful or the more powerful, a moral code designed for 
those equal in power will be at best nonfunctional, at worst an 
offensive pretense of equality as a substitute for its actuality .19 
/d. 
15. /d. at 257; see also Frankel, supra note 6, at 799. 
16. Frankel, supra note 6, at 800. 
17. Baier, supra note 11, at 250. 
/d. 
Contract enables us to make explicit just what we count on another person 
to do, in return for ... what damages can be extracted from them. The 
beauty of promise and contract is its explicitnelOS. But we can only make 
explicit provisions for such contigencies as we imagine arising. 
18. /d. at 249. These preferences are derived primarily from early childhood exper-
iences in which girls identify more closely with their primary care provider, the 
mother. Boys, on the other hand, are less concerned with relationships because they 
are essentially different than their mothers, and as they come to understand their 
differences with the primary care providers, they become more concerned with inde-
pendence and power and less concerned with relationships. See also C. GILLIGAN, 
IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). 
19. Baier, supra note 11, at 249. Professor Baier also argues that the contractarian 
model of ethics is male-oriented because of the individual characteristics of the male 
proponents of philosophical-ethical contract models that cause them to fixate on the 
contract model. She argues that males more typically misunderstand the need for 
the nature of trust in relationships. She writes: 
The great moral theorists in our tradition not only are all men, they are 
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Of course it is not at all clear, as Baier suggests, that women have a 
comer on feelings of concern that certain laws might have an adverse 
effect on relationships between parties of unequal bargaining power. 
Ironically, the law of corporations has been governed during earlier, 
more sexist times, by the fiduciary concepts of trust. Perhaps then advo-
cates of contractarian models are simply responding to the rise of equal-
ity between the sexes. Yet Baier's point is nonetheless valid, that the rise 
of the contractarian models has given way to a false, but universal, as-
sumption of equality which has obscured the need to treat some groups 
with more care than others. In describing the differences in the trust and 
contract models, Baier discovers a basis of critiquing the over-inclusive 
assumptions found in contractarian models of ethics. 
Baier further argues that modem contractarian philosophy is male-
oriented both because of who frames the issue (mostly males)20 and what 
examples. have been used to prove the contractarian model.21 Con-
tractarians concentrate on the morality of "fairly cool" relationships be-
tween those who are roughly equal in power.22 Although Baier 
recognizes that the contractarian model's exchange of promises involves 
trust, 23 she argues that promises are not a prerequisite for trust, and in 
mostly men who had minimal adult dealings with (and so were then mini-
mally influenced by) women. With a few significant exceptions (Hume, 
Hegel, J.S. Mill, Sidgwick, maybe Bradley) they are a collection of gays, 
clerics, misogynists, and puritan bachelors. It should not surprise us, 
then, that particularly in the modem period they managed to relegate to 
the mental background the web of trust tying most moral agents to one 
another, and to focus their philosophical attention so single-mindedly on 
cool, distanced relations between more or less free and equal adult stran-
gers, say, the members of an all male club, with membership rules and 
rules for dealing with rule breakers and where' the form of cooperation was 
restricted to ensuring that each member could read his Times in peace and 
have no one step on his gouty toes. Explicitly assumed or recognized obli-
gations toward others with the same obligations and the same power to see 
justice done to rule breakers then are seen as the moral norm. 
/d. at 247-48. 
20. /d. 
21. "Male-oriented" thinking explains why the typical ethical philosopher draws dilem-
mas from analyses of relations between governments. /d. at 249-50. Although be-
tween governments the contractarian model has some functional attributes, this 
model breaks down in the simplest of situations, for instance, when a citizen inter-
acts with the government. /d. at 250. 
The choice of the subject of ethical study affects the choice of the ethical model. 
If an ethicist focuses on the publicly held corporation rather than the closely held 
company, the model developed is less appropriate for the closely held company, just 
as the focus on ethics between nations obscures the nature of the ethics between a 
government and its citizens. 
22. /d. 
23. Baier, supra note 11, at 245. 
In his famous account of what a promise (and a contract) involves, Hume 
strongly implies that it is an artificially contrived and secured case of mu-
tual trust. The penalty to which a promisor subjects himself in promising, 
he says, is that of 'never being trusted again in case of failure.' The prob-
lem which the artifice of promise solves is a general disadvantageous 'want 
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fact an exchange of promises may inhibit trust.24 Contracts are designed 
for 
[ c ]ooperation between mutually suspicious risk adverse stran-
gers, and the vulnerability they involve is at the other extreme 
from that incurred by trusting infants. Contracts distribute and 
redistribute risk so as to minimize it for both parties, but trust-
ing those more powerful persons who purport to love one in-
creases one's risks while increasing the good one can hope to 
secure. Trust in fellow contractors is a limit [sic] case of trust, 
in which fewer risks are taken, for the sake of lesser goods.25 
Regardless of whether the contractarian model is male-oriented, 
other significant differences between the contractadan and trust models 
become clear. The contractarian and trust models in ethics differ in how 
each deals with harms and opportunities that arise over the course of the 
relationship. The contractarian model provides that when the contract 
does not cover a certain risk, the actor's behavior will be judged (as long 
as the actor did not act criminally) on the basis of the obligation that 
would have been contracted for had the parties foreseen this risk.26 
In comparison, the trust model assumes that the manager owes 
more to the entrustor 'than to self. If something goes wrong, the man-
ager's first obligation is to protect the entrustor's interest even at the ex-
pense of his own job. The same is true with opportunities. If new 
opportunity presents itself, the trust model confers ownership of the op-
portunity to the entrustor. The question of manager compensation is an 
afterthought. 
In addition, when using the contractarian model to judge a particu-
lar situation, there is a tendency to infer that the parties were aware of 
the risk at the beginning of their relationship. 27 It becomes much easier 
of mutual confidence and security.' It is plausible to construe the offer 
whose acceptance counts as acceptance of a contract or a promise as at 
least implicitly including an invitation to trust. 
ld. (quoting D. HUME, TREATISE 521-22 (1978)). 
24. /d. at 251. 
25. /d. 
26. L. SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTZ & J. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 
334, 335 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter L. SOLOMON]. When developing the hypotheti-
cal obligational contract the parties would have created to cover risks, the contract 
model assumes the transactional costs to bargain over the risk to be zero. /d. If one 
party bears a greater economic burden for the bargain, the contract model will read-
just the burden of risk in favor of that party. /d. 
27. See Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With 
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Mo. L. 
REV. 563, 578-585 (1982). 
Kennedy argues that it is possible for a decision maker to construe gaps and 
ambiguities in contracts from a distributive and/or paternalistic perspective. Most 
often, however, the motive of efficiency seems to be paramount. 
Efficiency motives differ from paternalist motives because their premise is 
that the affected parties will prefer the new situation to the old, so they 
would not choose to "waive" the benefits the decision maker has at-
374 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 18 
to rationalize therefore that because the harmed party did not bargain for 
protection in the first place, they assumed the risk of injury.28 And be-
cause some benefit likely inured for assuming the risk, it is "fair" that the 
harm lies where it falls. 29 Again, this model presumes that each party 
has equal bargaining power and equal choice to enter or exit the relation-
ship, which in many cases is an incorrect assumption. 
The contractarian model therefore may have an unhealthy side ef-
fect: it may cause the parties to fear that each will bear the burden of 
losses because each cannot possibly anticipate all risks that will arise and 
contract knowledgeably about them. 30 This fear will create distrust be-
tween the parties which may either destroy the relationship entirely or 
make it less beneficial to each.31 The bargaining process informs each 
party how they can be hurt and assumes that each will be free to injure 
the other absent a protective provision in the contract to the contrary. 
III. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MANAGERS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS 
How do these criticisms of the contractarian model in ethics apply 
to the relationships between managers and shareholders in a corporation? 
If a trust model is more appropriate for the parent-child relationship, 32 
and the contractarian model is more appropriate for "mutually suspi-
cious risk adverse strangers,"33 then why does it not follow that the con-
tractarian model is better for the corporation? 
The corporate relationship, epitomized by management's control of 
information and the day-to-day conduct of the parties, is strikingly simi-
lar to the relationship between parent and child: The passive investor 
tempted to confer on them. The decision maker is not trying to decide 
what is "really" best for them, without regard to their own views on the 
matter. On the other hand, an intervention grounded in efficiency con-
cerns will always involve speculation about what the parties "would have 
done" had they not been prevented by transaction costs. 
We might distinguish between efficiency and distributive motives on 
the ground that the first involve making both parties better off, while the 
second involve helping one at the expense of the other. However, I want 
to fudge this distinction, and treat as motivated by efficiency some inter-
ventions that have negative effects on some actors. In particular, I will 
treat as motivated by efficiency the following type of action: the decision 
maker imposes a term in a contract in the belief that if the parties had full 
information almost all sellers would offer it at a price that almost all buy-
ers would accept. In this case, there are some negative distributive im-
pacts, on those who wouldn't have offered the term and on those who 
wouldn't have paid for it had we not changed the rule to make them do so. 
/d. at 573-74. 
28. /d. 
29. /d. 
30. Baier, supra note 11, at 257-58. 
31. /d. 
32. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
33. See text accompanying note 25 supra. 
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depends on the manager like a child depends on the parents' knowledge 
and skill. Although shareholders' dependence is not as broad and perva-
sive, they nonetheless rely on the expertise of the corporate managers. 34 
Baier's criticism of the contractarian model is particularly applica-
ble to Maryland's new statute in the sense that, although the statute deals 
with a complex, continuous relationship where the fundamental model 
for making decisions implicitly requires that the manager be loyal to 
subordinate shareholders, the scheme of the new statute disregards the 
need for loyalty in this arguably unbalanced corporate relationship. The 
statute's disregard for the subordinate position of shareholders is best 
illustrated by its burden of proof requirements. 
Prior to its amendment in 1988, the statute adopted a trust model 
approach, allowing shareholders to prove the existence of a conflict of 
interest merely by showing that they were not fully informed of corpo-
rate affairs and that the manager personally benefited from the disputed 
transaction. 35 The manager could escape liability only if he could prove 
that he acted fairly. 36 Thus, the prior statute protected the entrusting 
shareholders by placing the ultimate burden of proving the fairness of a 
manager's transaction on the manager himself. 
The new statute, on the other hand, provides that the risk of loss be 
borne by shareholders unless they prove that the manager's taking was 
34. See Brudney, supra note 7, at 1404, where the author states: 
/d. 
But the contract concept has serious defects for at least one of the signifi-
cant purposes for which it is offered - as a description of the relationship 
between investors, particularly stockholders, in publicly owned corpora-
tions and managers. In that context, the rhetoric of contract proceeds on 
doubtful assumptions about the circumstances of the parties, imports inap-
propriate normative consequences to govern the relationships thus as-
sumed, and serves the ideological function of legitimating substantially 
unaccountable managerial discretion to determine corporate activities and 
to serve itself at the expense of investors. 
35. See supra note 5. 
36. L. SOLOMON supra note 26, at 714 (2d ed. 1988); see also Brudney, supra note 7, at 
1407; cf REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1984) (which does not 
indicate explicitly who has the burden of proving fairness, once a conflict is estab-
lished). 
Baier's argument about the failing of contract language in moral philosophy is 
reminiscent of the debate concerning the meaning of the words "good faith" found 
in the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that contract law declares part 
of contracts for the sale of goods. Brudney argues that the analysis of whether 
conduct is improper, or in bad faith, under a contract is different from analysis of 
whether a person has acted loyally. If not, how is the contract relationship different 
from relationships based on status, or fiduciary principles? Id. at 1404-05; cf Ken-
nedy, supra note 27, at 573. Kennedy argues that gaps in contract law, filled by the 
decision maker according to the criteria of what the parties would have decided had 
they been able to contract with zero transaction cost, is a meaningless standard that 
is capable of being manipulated paternalistically to serve relational purposes. Ken-
nedy notes that it is unlikely to be used this way because of the values those who use 
this standard are likely to have - values of individual responsibility on the part of 
the en trustor to protect himself from harm. /d. at 598. 
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improper.37 Moreover, the new statute includes no duty of loyalty and 
insulates a manager who acts in "good faith" from suit by the corpora~ 
tion or stockholders. Arguably, therefore, under the new statutory 
scheme, the burden of proving the unfairness of a manager's transaction 
never shifts to the manager; instead the burden remains with the share-
holder to prove that the manager treated shareholders unfairly. This 
shifting of the burden of proof to shareholders is unrealistic in light of 
their limited access to transactional information and their lack of in-
volvement in the day-to-day operation of the corporation. Even if share-
holders were to have unlimited ability to access such information, the 
evidence of managerial misconduct that shareholders present may be in-
sufficient because of the equivocal meaning of "good faith" as it is used in 
the new statute. 38 
The General Assembly's replacement of the duty of loyalty with the 
concept of good faith will make it increasingly difficult for courts faced 
with the task of defining good faith to include in their definition the no-
tion of a selfless fiduciary. 39 Instead, courts will be presented with the 
argument that the "selflessness" implied in the concept of loyalty to 
shareholders has been rejected by the Maryland legislature. 
By releasing the manager from a duty of loyalty, "good faith" will 
become a question of interpretation for the courts, an interpretation that 
will likely divert their attention to maxims of documentary or statutory 
interpretation. This diversion will inevitably lead the finder of fact to 
hopelessly contradictory assumptions about the meaning and purpose of 
the statutory language.40 No longer will altruism and selfless concern be 
the standard against which good faith is to be measured. Instead, the 
court's analysis will center on a comparison between the manager's alleg-
edly improper behavior and the behavior expected of a manager moti-
vated by self-interest, but who acts in "good faith" nonetheless. 
The contractarian model adopted by the new statute looks backward 
to the old model of nineteenth century laissez-faire individualism, where 
society works best when individuals are unhampered by government reg-
ulation.41 Under this scheme, courts are less likely to ask whether the 
relationship between management and shareholders would be better 
served if managers got specific permission from shareholders before act-
ing in self-interest. Rather, the court will substitute its judgment that the 
corporation would permit its managers to expend corporate funds for 
personal benefit because, if the corporation was opposed to those expend-
37. This shifting of the burden of proof shows up in the indemnification portion of the 
Maryland statute. It provides that the officer or director will be indemnified by the 
corporation unless it is proved by a contesting party that the individual acted in bad 
faith. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2.418(b) (Supp. 1988); see also MD. 
CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2(a) (Supp. 1988). 
38. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 2.418 (Supp. 1988). 
39. Kennedy, supra note 27, at 580. 
40. /d. at 599-604. 
41. L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 20-24 (1965). 
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itures, it could have contracted against them. 42 
In the great majority of cases, the loss would fall on the sharehold-
ers unless they anticipated the particular risk and contracted for protec-
tion. Therefore, shareholders either need to become educated about such 
risks or to pay someone else to protect them against the various and sun-
dry ways managers may take advantage of their status in the corpora-
tion.43 Some legal commentators contend, however, that such' an 
awareness on the part of shareholders will seldom if ever exist.44 Under 
the model of the new statute then, the shareholder will be left largely 
unprotected. Using Baier's analogy, they are left in a position like that of 
children without parents to protect them. 
IV. PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS 
It is necessary to distinguish between large, publicly held corpora-
tions and closely held companies. Arguably, Baier's criticism of the con-
tractarian model suggests that such a model may be appropriate for the 
widely traded national stock exchange company, where bargaining takes 
place through market efficiency.45 Because the widely traded company 
allows for easy transferability of ownership, and managers are deterred 
from unreasonable conflicts of interest by the close scrutiny of market 
analysts and major institutional stockholders, it is reasonable to say that 
a bargain has been implicitly struck over the bearing of risks. Addition-
ally, the contractarian model is appropriate because of the equality of 
bargaining power and access to information among larger shareholders, 
42. Kennedy, supra note 27, at 599-604. There is also the real possibility that courts 
will take an even more extreme position in favor of protecting managers. Most 
judges (perhaps because of their lawyering experiences) are particularly adept at 
finding ambiguity in the language of the contract. And obviously there will be occa-
sions when the corporate contract will not even remotely cover the conduct in-
volved. Some judges might analogize that good faith means what it means to the 
lawyer bringing a lawsuit under a statute, i.e., that where there is a way that the 
statute can be read that justifies the law suit, the attorney is acting in good faith. 
Similarly, where there is a way the manager's contract can be interpreted that justi-
fies the manager's behavior, the manager's behavior is in good faith. The focus is on 
a good faith interpretation of a supposedly neutral document which in most in-
stances has in fact been drafted by one of the parties, the one with the greatest 
advantage. 
43. See Honabach, Consent, Exit, and the Contract Model ofthe Corporation -A Com-
mentary on Maryland's New Director and Officer Liability Limiting and Indemnifi-
cation Legislation, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 310, 320-21 (1989). Honabach argues that 
at least with respect to new corporations, this open ended protection that matches 
loyalty protection will be priced out of existence. 
44. See M.A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 68 (1976); Harris, 
The Model Business Corporation Act- Invitation to Irresponsibility?, 50 Nw. U.L. 
REv. !, 9 (1955). Professor Eisenberg argues that "in the publicly held corporation 
true shareholder agreement is all but impossible. [S]tockholders ... [in such .corpo-
rations] do not know of the provisions of the articles of incorporation, and, gener-
ally, if they did, they would not realize what the consequences of such provisions 
might be until it is too late." M.A. EISENBERG, supra at 68. 
45. See, e.g., Honabach, supra note 43, at 325-31. 
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despite the inequality in the bargaining power of any single 
shareholder. 46 
This argument, however, ignores the realities of publicly held corpo-
rations. As Professor Eisenberg demonstrates, the need to check mana-
gerial self-interest and inefficiency remains as great in a publicly held 
situation as in a closely held setting.47 Because managers in a publicly 
held company are delegated the responsibility for all business decisions, 
as the volume of decisions grows and the choices become more complex, 
the number of conflicts will multiply. The ability of the market analyst 
and the institutional manager to know about the propriety of these trans-
actions remains in doubt, and without adequate information, the market 
cannot act efficiently. The fact that a manager is acting as the agent of a 
large corporation does not diminish the manager's incentive to take ad-
vantage of his position in the company by covering up crucial informa-
tion and by hoisting all adverse risks onto shareholders.48 
V. THE CLOSELY HELD COMPANY 
As inappropriate as the contractarian model may be for the publicly 
traded company, the new statute is at least equally inappropriate in the 
context of closely held companies. Because there is no secondary market 
for the shares, there is uncertainty in the value of the shares.49 Thus, it is 
difficult for a seller to find a buyer willing to purchase what is unknown. 
Because of the inapplicability of the federal reporting statutes 5° to closely 
held businesses, it is much more difficult to monitor managers. The rec-
ord keeping and minute taking habits of the closely held business are 
often more sloppy; shareholder meetings occur with less frequency and 
less formality; and there is no group of market analysts keeping watch 
over stock movements. There is also a zero sum game in closely held 
corporations between the dividend policy and salary distribution. This 
causes greater conflict between shareholders and managers, usually over 
fewer dollars. s' 
There is also a difference in the emotional aspects of the relationship 
between the parties. This difference is at the heart of Baier's critique as it 
applies to the corporate setting. In closely held corporations, family 
members often rely on other family members to exercise their judgment 
46. Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 
271-79 (1986). 
47. M.A. EISENBERG, supra note 44; Brudney, supra note 7, at 1405. 
48. Brudney, supra note 7, at 1405 n.5. Note also that if a contract will be the basis of 
obligations between shareholders and the corporation, the distinction between debt 
and equity will also be further blurred. If shareholders can contract over their 
rights to participate in corporate management, they may lose their status as share-
holders and their protection of limited liability. 
49. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 46; see also Honabach, supra note 43, 325-31. 
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-ii (1982); Securites and Exchange Act, 1934, §§ 12-14. 
51. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 46. 
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in favor of the entire family. 52 Closely held corporations often grow out 
of an expansion in a family business that was once a partnership. 53 Since 
the parties were accustomed to the fiduciary model of a partnership, they 
may expect that model to continue to govern the relationship even when 
the entity is incorporated. When the initial partners retire or leave the 
business, the family members of those partners depend on the judgment 
of the new managers to continue to work together and treat each member 
of the clan fairly. Not only do family members depend on the managers 
to keep the business healthy and family tradition intact, they,also rely on 
the managers to keep the bond of the family unit strong. This heavy 
reliance by family members on family managers will cause a more vola-
tile and emotional reaction by shareholders to managerial misconduct. 54 
Applying Baier's criticisms of the contractarian model in ethics, it 
becomes clear that the application of the contract model to the closely 
held corporate setting will have an adverse affect on the relationships of 
the parties. The absence of manager loyalty and selflessness will drive 
the parties as business partners and family members apart. The contract 
gives the manager an extra excuse to act selfishly. Those who complain 
would have to face their own "failure" or lack of foresight to explicitly 
protect themselves. The shift away from the duty of loyalty language 
and the shift in the burden of proving improper benefit will have the 
intended effect of diminishing shareholder challenges to manager actions. 
The contractarian argues at this point, so what?55 These costs are 
simply the costs of an investment in a closely held corporation. 56 If the 
costs are too great or the return insufficient, investors can first seek disso-
lution and then seek other forms of investment. 57 Yet this seemingly 
simple solution ignores both the difficulty of proving illegality of behav-
ior under dissolution statutes and the historical trap in which many 
shareholders find themselves. 58 Shareholders in a closely held corpora-
tion cannot easily transfer in and out of the relationship because there is 
no market for their shares. It is therefore difficult for anyone to know 
what is going on, much less to second-guess a director's decision con-
cerning the value of what the business is worth. While under either the 
trust or the contractarian model such second-guessing is left to the 
courts, under the trust model the manager has the burden of proving that 
the transaction in question was fair. Under the scheme of the new Mary-
land statute, the shifting of the burden of proof to the shareholder to 
52. See, e.g., Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 29 
Del. Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (1946), modified, Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Com-
bined Shows, Inc., 29 Del. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947). 
53. L. SOLOMON, supra note 26, at 342. 
54. See, e.g., Ringling Bros., 29 Del. Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (1946). 
55. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 46. 
56. /d. 
57. /d. 
58. Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation, 
1969 ILL. L.F. 1, 10-25. 
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prove improper personal benefit is therefore a crucial element to be satis-
fied before a shareholder can be successful in challenging management. 
The shift in models may leave shareholders unprotected from acts of 
disloyalty. 
Finally, will selecting a contractarian model in the closely held cor-
porate setting restrict the potential for even greater returns for both par-
ties should they operate in a relationship based on trust? What Baier's 
argument questions is the capitalistic assumption that selfishly motivated 
decisions of the manager will necessarily redound to the benefit of the 
entity. 59 Perhaps instead, encouraging the selfish interest of managers 
will distract managers from the "business of business" to the detriment 
of both shareholders and managers. 
VI. IS THE MARYLAND STATUTE SEXIST? 
The new Maryland statute permits managers to contract for releases 
from the traditional duty of loyalty as long as shareholders "agree." And 
shareholders are particularly likely to agree to management's suggestions 
if the shareholders have not shifted their model of the relationship the 
way the Maryland statute presumes that they will. Shareholders are un-
likely to understand the trade-off inherent in the release of managers 
from loyalty constraints and to contract adequately for their future pro-
tection. Even if the shareholders understand the implications of the 
change in corporate models for the corporation and bargain for protec-
tion, the adversarial atmosphere created by such negotiations will cause 
managers to take advantage of opportunities to seize assets for them-
selves, as long as they are not explicitly prohibited from doing so by the 
contract. After all, under the new statute they are freed from their loy-
alty to others, and now need only look out for themselves.60 
Baier's ethical argument is persuasive that the statute is a natural 
result of an incomplete ethical model. 61 The Maryland statute focuses on 
59. Kennedy, supra note 27, at 578-85. 
60. Of course it can be argued that if family considerations do not already raise the 
ethical obligations to treat family stockholders fairly, then corporate models would 
not make any difference. Yet before the Maryland statute the legal corporate and 
family "oughts" were similar. If the contract model works like it is supposed to, the 
corporate contract model will encourage managers to justify their behavior by imag-
ining that their obligations to their family members as family members can be di-
vorced from their obligations to these same individuals as shareholders. The 
contract model assumes self interested bargaining will and must take place in order 
that the risks be fully explored and fairly distributed. If a manager understands that 
his ethical obligations towards an in-law or cousin who owns shares arise from a 
contract as opposed to a model of trust derived from the manager's status in the 
family, the manager will likely act more adversarially and more from a perspective 
of self interest. 
61. Baier's point, however, is not that ethical models ought to favor or even balance the 
rights of men and women; instead she suggests that these models should be used to 
improve relationships generally for everyone. Of course Baier may be unduly "femi-
nist" in orientation and therefore does not recognize that many males have been 
very vocal against the use of the contractarian model in law. Perhaps she should be 
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the fairly cool relationship between hypothetical shareholders and man-
agers who stand in equal bargaining power, have equal knowledge and 
skill, and are mutually suspicious and risk adverse. Under Baier's analy-
sis the statute makes male-oriented assumptions about parties to the rela-
tionship. The drafters ignored the statute's affect on the passive investor 
who has little business expertise, and on the closely held family corpora-
tion, where there is relatively unequal bargaining power among the 
parties. 
Relationships in which parties are without information and eco-
nomic leverage will be more distrustful and aggressively hostile where 
the ethical model for the relationship is contractarian rather than one 
based on trust. Baier argues that a contractarian model produces harm-
ful side effects in some relationships, but that men typically miss these 
side effects because they typically care less whether people get along. 62 
When the Maryland statute rejects the duty of loyalty provisions in 
favor of enabling contract provisions it is not sexist, but is mistakenly 
male-oriented because it overlooks the effect it will have on the relation-
ships between managers and shareholders. The statute is incomplete be-
cause it is less concerned about healthy relationships and more 
concerned about power. 
In order to evaluate Baier's argument in the corporate context, it is 
important to note that contract models are replacing trust models. Con-
tractarians would certainly argue that the problems with trust models of 
corporate behavior have been fully understood and explored, and that 
forgiven for her oversight because she is not joining her debate with the legal profes-
sion. Yet the legal critics of the contract model are drawing on political philosophy 
to support their critiques. See, G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 94 (1974). 
Gilmore writes: 
/d. 
We started with Professor Friedman's suggestion that the "model" of 
classical contract theory bore a close resemblance to the "model" of what 
he calls "liberal" - or I suppose, laissez-faire - economic theory. In 
both models as he put it, "the parties could be treated as individual eco-
nomic units which, in theory, enjoyed complete mobility and freedom of 
decision." I suppose that laissez-faire economic theory comes down to 
something like this: If we all do exactly as we please, no doubt everything 
will work out for the best. Which does seem to be about the same thing 
that the contract theory comes down to, with liability reduced to a mini-
mum and sanctions for breach cut back to the vanishing point .... 
It seems apparent to the twentieth century mind, as perhaps it did not 
the nineteenth century mind, that a system in which everybody is invited 
to do his own thing, at whatever cost to his neighbor, must work ulti-
mately to the benefit of the rich and powerful, who are in a position to 
look after themselves and to act, so to say, as their own self-insurers. 
I am not suggesting then that the Maryland legislators who voted for the stat-
ute lacked meaningful relationships with women, (or as Baier argues concerning 
ethicists, that contractarians must have lacked the sensitivity brought to them, typi-
cally by women, that contractarian models of ethics have shortcomings that trust 
models provide for). Instead, I join Baier and Gilmore in arguing that the con-
tractarian model ignores the disparity in parties bargaining positions. 
62. See supra note 19 and acompanying text. 
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the levels of loyalty expected from corporate managers have been too 
high and have had an overwhelmingly negative effect on the manager-
shareholder relationship. 63 There are too many lawsuits and the loyalty 
standard is too uncertain for courts to deal efficiently with questions con-
cerning the manager's behavior. Contractarians argue that under the old 
model, managers are spending too much time protecting themselves from 
lawsuits, rather than exercising their good faith business judgment in 
favor of shareholders. 64 
Yet trust theorists question whether the con tractarians grasp the 
fact that the contractarian model will affect the manager's willingness to 
work for others. If the corporation is nothing more than a nexus of con-
tracts, will management believe it has any obligation to act in favor of 
shareholders? The contractarian model is essentially a "trust us" and 
"you can't successfully sue us" position. Baier instead argues for a "trust 
first" but "sue later" model. 
The implication of Baier's argument in the corporate setting is that 
the contractarian model does not inspire trust but, instead, moves the 
adversarial considerations from litigation, if it ever arises, to the begin-
ning of the relationship. It also changes management's motivation to act 
for shareholders. By moving adversarial bargaining to the front of the 
relationship, greater distrust of both the manager and the shareholder 
will result. This distrust threatens the vitality and psychology of the 
relationship. 
Whether the failure of the Maryland statute to comprehend the im-
portance of trust in a corporate relationship is a result of male thinking 
or not, Baier's critique of contractarian models of decisionmaking is a 
sound one in the corporate context. Any statute that makes under-inclu-
sive assumptions about the nature of the parties who are covered by it is 
shortsighted. Any statute that encourages members to distrust each 
other where they would otherwise trust each other is wrongheaded, 
whether written by men or by women. Baier and Gilligan's point is an 
interesting caution to those who propose contract solutions as a salvation 
of ethical dilemmas. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Maryland is not alone in its adoption of a contract model of corpo-
rate governance. Georgia, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Car-
olina, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Virginia have done away with 
loyalty language in favor of contracting language as the basis of obliga-
tions regarding managers' conduct. 65 The emerging contract model ig-
63. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 46; see also Garrett, Attitudes on Corporate 
Democracy- A Critical Analysis, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 310, 310-11 (1956). 
64. /d. 
65. Hanks, supra note 4, at 48; see also CAL CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1977 & Supp. 
1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1983 & Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-
801 (1982 & Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78-140 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
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nores two crucial realities of the corporate situation: 1) shareholders are 
unlikely to understand the nature of the bargain that is suggested to them 
by management, and 2) the necessity of encouraging a condusive atmos-
phere for a thriving relationship between management and shareholders. 
While many argue that people are inherently selfish and that the con-
tractarian model forces each side to get their selfishness out on the table, 
that argument overlooks the fact that many relationships thrive when 
they are based on selfless rather than selfish motivations. Many profes-
sional managers understand that they are subject to ethical responsibili-
ties arising from the status they hold in the relationship; they know they 
have "professional" obligations which define their responsibilities beyond 
the specific contract language. If the statute advises the manager to ig-
nore professional obligations of loyalty and bargain adversarially from 
the beginning, it will rework the fundamental nature of the relationship 
among the parties, sacrificing the atmosphere of trust on the altar of 
contract. 66 
§ 53-11-35(B) (Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 717 (McKinney Supp. 1989); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 410 (Purdon Supp. 
1988); VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-870 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 23 A. 08.343 
(Supp. 1989). 
66. Cf G. GILMORE, supra note 61, at 94. Gilmore seems to be describing the death of 
contract analysis but concludes with the question - "but who knows what unlikely 
resurrection the Easter-tide may bring?" Id. at 103. I believe that Eastertide has 
arrived and that contract analysis has been resurrected in the form of a law and 
economics theory as applied to corporations. 
